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Target restrictions

Which target addresses and ports are refused, the fixed hostname resolution behaviour, and the practical consequences of no UDP support.

The gateway checks the target address before opening the exit connection. This page lists what's refused, plus behaviours that aren't "restrictions" but will shape your design.

Refused addresses

The explicitly blocked CIDR ranges:

CIDRNotes
0.0.0.0/8Unspecified / this network
100.64.0.0/10CGNAT shared address space
127.0.0.0/8IPv4 loopback
169.254.0.0/16IPv4 link-local (includes cloud metadata addresses)
224.0.0.0/4IPv4 multicast
::1/128IPv6 loopback
fc00::/7IPv6 unique local addresses
fe80::/10IPv6 link-local

Refused ports

PortNotes
25SMTP

Hostname resolution is pinned

Practical consequences:

The upside: your local DNS never sees the target domain (when using socks5h://), so you don't reveal what you're visiting.

Things to watch:

What you might expectWhat actually happens
The domain resolves in the exit IP's region, giving you a nearby CDN nodeResolution happens at the gateway, not in the exit region
Multiple A records load-balance across IPsAlways the first IP
The target distributing content by resolver originDistribution follows the gateway's location, not the exit IP

No UDP support

What you'll actually run into

When curl or a browser negotiates HTTP/3: it fails or falls back to HTTP/2. Pinning the version explicitly is more predictable:

shell
curl --http2 -x 'http://USER:PASS@GATEWAY_HOST:58971' https://example.com

Chrome enables QUIC by default: it usually disables QUIC when a proxy is configured, but you can turn it off explicitly:

shell
google-chrome --proxy-server="http://GATEWAY_HOST:58971" --disable-quic

WebRTC leaks your real IP: because UDP can't traverse, WebRTC attempts a direct connection. In anti-detect browsers, WebRTC must be set to "replace with proxy IP" or "disable", never "real". See Browsers and anti-detect browsers.

No inbound TLS

The gateway does not terminate TLS and has no TLS listener.

Extra restrictions in ordinary forward mode

Forward mode (http:// sites without CONNECT) has two additional rules:

CaseResult
An https:// absolute URL in the request line400 — HTTPS must use CONNECT
Userinfo in the request line's URL (http://u:p@host/)400

Headers are rewritten (forward mode only)

In ordinary HTTP forward mode these headers are removed:

  • Proxy-Authorization, Proxy-Connection
  • Every hop-by-hop extension header listed in Connection
  • Connection, Keep-Alive, Proxy-Authenticate, TE, Trailer, Transfer-Encoding

Plus: non-Upgrade requests are forced to Connection: close, and Host and Content-Length are rebuilt when necessary.

Once a CONNECT tunnel or SOCKS5 connection is established, the gateway does not parse the tunnel contents and none of the above applies. So fingerprint-sensitive work should use HTTPS/CONNECT or SOCKS5.

IPv6

ItemStatus
IPv6 target addressesSupported (both HTTP and SOCKS5 can parse them)
IPv6 client accessDepends on node and load balancer configuration; not guaranteed
Passwordless-port source bindingIPv4 only
IP whitelistIPv4 only (public global unicast)
shell
# IPv6 target
curl -x 'http://USER:PASS@GATEWAY_HOST:58971' 'http://[2001:db8::1]/'

Quick triage

SymptomWhich rule on this page
403 reaching an internal addressPrivate addresses blocked
403 reaching 169.254.169.254Cloud metadata address blocked
SMTP won't connectPort 25 blocked
HTTP/3 requests failNo UDP support
WebRTC exposes the real IPNo UDP support; WebRTC must be disabled browser-side
SOCKS5 reply 0x07You're using UDP ASSOCIATE or BIND
CDN node not in the exit regionHostname resolved at the gateway
An https:// proxy URL won't connectNo inbound TLS
Can't whitelist an IPv6 addressThe whitelist is IPv4 only

Full error codes in the error reference.

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